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THE REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL 
I 
The lower classes in Portugal, particularly in the country, 
are as hard working, sober, peaceable, and well-mannered a people 
as one could hope to find. They are, however, incredibly ignor-
ant. To me it was a joy and wonder to find in Lisbon that the 
servants could not tell time by the clock, and that they thought 
the French tongue was merely an impediment of speech. I twas 
a temptation never before dreamed of and triumphantly endured, 
to discover that the washerwoman would accept with childlike 
faith whatever was offered her because she could not count 
money. As for reading and writing, they are -to these simple 
people something like miracles of cleverness. 
This picturesque ignorance one finds at first merely diverting, 
as an unexpected example of artistic perfection; but unfortunately 
when accompanied by its inevitable shadow, extreme poverty, 
it produces that lethargy and passivity which underlies the 
tragedy of the history of Portugal. In the absence of a highly 
developed industry these peasants form the great majority of the 
Portuguese nation; but they are politically negligible. In as far 
as they are anything they are monarchists, submissive to the 
Church; but they have had no influence upon recent events. The 
revolution in Portugal follows the general rule in being the work 
of an active minority concentrated in the towns. In Portugal, as 
elsewhere, it is the minority which is politically effective. 
In extraordinary contrast to these simple, docile peasants, 
the upper classes in Lisbon are undeniably clever. They are 
distinguished by an impatient mental alertness. They perceive 
in a flash and turn quickly to other things. In linguistic ability 
they are second only to the Poles and the Russians. They are 
bilingual to such an extent that French literature is a serious 
detriment to the development of their own. One is safe in 
assuming that an educated Portuguese speaks French; he prob-
ably speaks it fluently and without foreign accent. They are all 
deeply impregnated with French art and philosophy, and French 
influence is seen in everything they do. Yet this is but a success-
ful veneer; for in temperament and character they are not French 
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at all, but rather more akin to the Italians. They are excellent 
musicians and superb orators, bu~ as administrators they are 
not eminent. They co-operate badly and are prone to factions. 
Foreigners complain of a certain vanity, which is, however, but 
superficial. Beneath the surface there lurks an ill-concealed 
distrust of themselves and of one another. They know that they 
lack persistence and that they are easily discouraged. Like the 
Poles they are a ready prey to dejection and melancholy. 
All this explains in part why the Portuguese mismanage their 
politics. The political virtues, says Bagehot, are the stupid ones. 
In Portugal stupidity is the monopoly of the unpolitical classes. 
The political classes are volatile; the others, immovable. Portu-
gal, like so many small countries, is a land of violent contrasts. 
The golden mean is lacking, which in constitutional government 
signifies a preponderant and self-respecting middle class. Par-
liamentary institutions, the product of English social conditions, 
have worked badly among them. In times of political crisis 
the English hold public meetings; the Portuguese choose a 
dictator. 
It is perhaps unnecessary to explain that this small intellec-
tual class is itself not a unit. It has many social nuances and 
cleavages, among which that between the aristocracy on the one 
hand and a part of the professional classes on the other, is suf-
ficiently marked to have political consequences. 
The aristocracy of Portugal is an old and distinguished one. 
Disraeli, an expert in such matters, was proud to trace an ima-
ginary descent to this source. Under an absolute ruler raised 
from their ranks, the government of the country was for centuries 
their monopoly, and they acquired vast estates which were 
entailed and inalienable. Early in the nineteenth century these 
entails were broken. Their property was dissipated and their 
political monopoly destroyed. Though a small body closely 
related by intermarriage, they have not the arrogant pride of 
the English aristocracy, to which on the whole they are not 
inferior. Owing to their traditional attachment to the monarchy 
and the Church, this admirable and unspoilt element finds itself 
in irreconcilable conflict with the new repUblic. So many have 
gone abroad that they form a body of political emigres very irri-
tating to the repUblicans at home, not dissimilar to the French nob-
lesse during the French Revolution. The revolution has resulted 
for the time being in the complete loss of their political power. 
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I t is from the second, the professional class, that the leaders 
of the revolution have arisen. They are lawyers, journalists, 
physicians, and university men, inferior to the aristocracy in 
traditions of culture, but not in intelligence, or perhaps in wealth. 
They are illuminati, positivists in philosophy, and anti-clerical. 
With them is associated a not particularly admirable bourgeoisie. 
As the Russian constitutionalists look to England for inspiration. 
they look to France. French republicanism is their ideal. Un-
like the English gentry who assumed parliamentary control in 
1640, they have had no political training, especially in matters 
of administration and public finance. What they knew about 
politics they learned in the school of journalistic opposition. 
They have intrigued in the Cortes, written seditious articles, and 
gone to prison. The rest was theory. 
From this political and administrative inexperience flow two 
of the three serious difficulties now threatening the republic; 
namely, the continuation of the financial disorder and the quarrel 
with the Catholic Church. It was disorganised finances more 
than any other cause that brought about the revolution, and it is 
here that the revolution has least justified itself. The republic 
has produced a master of political manipulation, but not a min-
ister of finance. As to the religious difficulty, it is possible that 
an ultimate quarrel could not have been avoided with a body so 
tenacious of its privileges as the clergy; but it might easily have 
been moderated or postponed. These inexperienced and doc-
trinaire politicians have followed naively the pattern of French 
revolutions and have acted as though anti-clericalism were a 
sufficient programme for a new republic. 
The third difficulty arises inevitably out of the nature of the 
revolution itself. For this revolution, unlike those in Latin-
American countries, is not a mere transference of power from one 
small class of the community to another. Nor is it merely an 
anti-monarchical and anti-clerical revolt. It is a social and 
political uprising of the labouring classes in the towns, particu-
larly in Lisbon, against the double pressure of crushing taxes and 
nSlng prices. It is a social upheaval, a serious attempt to erect 
a democracy upon that unpromising foundation, the disorganised 
working classes of Lisbon. 
It should be said parenthetically that Lisbon plays a r~le in 
this revolution similar to that of London in the Puritan revolu-
tion and Paris in the French revolutions. In fact it may almost 
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be said that Lisbon is the revolution. As in France, the Latin 
traditions of centralisation a~e strong, and so important a city as 
Oporto dare not remove a rock from the Douro without the 
previous consent of the metropolis. Lisbon is republican. 
Without it there would have been no republic and without it the 
republic would disappear like morning mist. We must, therefore, 
consider briefly the social conditions and the mental traits of this 
awakening class, the labourers of the Portuguese capital. 
These labourers show few traces of the unconscious self-
reliance and well-fed aggressiveness of the American democracy. 
They have, in general, a high degree of manual skill; but they are 
poor, deferential to their superiors, and hitherto they have shown 
no faculty for co-operation, which as a matter of fact was prac-
tically forbidden under the monarchy. A young Englishman in 
the employ of the Lisbon telephone company told me that their 
workmen constantly made repairs which in England were never 
done outside the factory. He thought them admirable in work 
requiring nicety and perfection of detail. They are not wholly 
illiterate like the peasants; but it is significant that until recently 
socialist doctrines have found few adherents among them. 
Since the revolution one hears of socialist and even of syndicalist 
groups. Their political impotence has arisen from their lack of 
aggressiveness and cohesion, which in tum arises from their 
poverty. 
Notwithstanding the rapid rise of factories in Lisbon and 
Oporto in recent years, Portuguese industry is still largely carried 
on in small shops without elaborate machinery, after the manner 
sometimes known as arts and crafts. Lisbon workmen in certain 
trades-as jewelry, tile making, and carving-have been famous 
for centuries. Their traditions, derived from Moorish times, 
have survived the earthquake, repeated revolutions, and a long-
continued national poverty. Certain characteristics of this 
manufacture are wholly admirable. Its products are not stand-
ardised according to the American practice. A special order and 
a variation in the product are not to them an annoyance and an 
expense, but a source of interest. A new order presents a new 
problem, and in so far the product is an artistic achievement. 
All this would have delighted the heart of William Morris; but 
it is accompanied by a drawback which I fear he did not fully 
realise. Except for articles of mode in which price is subordinate, 
the returns for such labour are necessarily meagre. I never tired 
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of pausing in the doorways of these shops to watch the workmen, 
often with deep respect for the perfection of their skill; but the 
marks of poverty were only too deeply stamped upon them. 
The first introduction of factories does not lead to an im-
mediate improvement in the conditions of labour. It did not in 
England during the eighteenth century, and it does not now either 
in Russia or Portugal. Under the monarchy few laws regulating 
the condition of labour were passed, and those few were carelessly 
enforced. Portugal was in this respect one of the most backward 
countries of Europe. The laws controlling the formation of 
labour unions were so restrictive as to be prohibitory in practice. 
As for strikes, they were simply forbidden. 
An English agent of the Lisbon tramway tells me that their 
employees are the highest paid in Lisbon; their maximum is $1.10 
a day for motormen. The average wage for Portugal is far less 
than in America, the hours are long, and prices in general are as 
high. The attendants at the National Archives receive twelve 
dollars a month. Public-school teachers begin with thirty cents 
a day, which is gradually raised, after twenty years' service, to 
a dollar a day. "How can we teach when the walls of our 
stomachs are grinding together!" exclaimed a young teacher, in 
explaining why the percentage of illiteracy in Portugal is between 
70 and So. When a deputation waited upon Dom Joao Franco 
with the teachers' grievances, that much harassed statesman 
replied, "Let them plant potatoes. " 
The Portuguese lower classes live on bread, codfish, string 
beans, and wine. The wine, the one cheap article of this diet, 
costs eight cents a litre, and must be execrable, though I have 
never found anyone who had ever tasted it. Wheat and codfish 
are largely imported and since IS92 have paid an iniquitously 
heavy tariff, that on wheat being 60 per cent. The other two 
pay a heavy octroi upon entering Lisbon. The octroi alone 
amounts to more than six dollars per capita per annum, of which 
40 per cent. is consumed in the collection. Owing partly to these 
tariffs, the price of foodstuffs has nearly doubled during the past 
twenty years. This is one of the causes of the downfall of the 
monarchy. They are still rising, and may yet wreck the republic. 
Abused patience leads to fury. At the revolution the depths 
were stirred. The prohibition of strikes having been removed, 
there occurred an epidemic of them similar to that in Russia in 
the autumn of 1905. At one time there were in Lisbon one 
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hundred strikes in progress. 'J Twenty-four new ones were an-
nounced in a single day. They involved everything from the 
leading industries-the railways, the tramways, the lighting sys-
tems-down to the humblest employments. The washerwomen 
refused to wash, having conceived the idea that the social order 
was about to be inverted and that they would by this simple 
process be brought to the top, with palaces to live in. "Perhaps 
you will be washing for me, " said one of them shyly to a lady of 
my acquaintance. The Lisbon proletariat suddenly assumed a 
noticeably less deferential manner toward their superiors. 
Having New York standards in mind, I was at first at a loss to 
understand the horror with which this change was mentioned, 
for Lisbon manners seemed to me still fairly idyllic; but after 
meeting the peasants, I could see that the people of the towns 
had lost something. Even now, as the porter or attendant 
rises at your approach and stands respectfully as long as he can 
catch a glimpse of your august presence, you reflect that this is a 
part of the old Chesterfieldian order, destined speedily to dis-
appear. The Portuguese are still, however, one of the politest 
people in Europe. 
We have now reached the seamy side of the revolution. Mob 
violence was 'for a time rampant. Yet few heads were broken, 
and, apart from the wrecking of the offices of certain plain-speak-
ing newspapers, not much property was destroyed. The Por-
tuguese are neither vicious nor always courageous. A Lisbon 
mob, ragged, largely barefooted, and wonderfully odorous, is not 
really formidable and readily respects a show of force. 
These outbreaks were nevertheless sufficiently alarming to 
those against whom they were directed. Those who could, left 
the country. Those who could not, left Lisbon. Owners of 
property began to ask if this was the fruit of the new teaching. 
Many leading republicans, forgetting that revolutions are rough 
work, and disappointed to find their roseate dreams not im-
mediately realised, retired from politics or became apostate. In 
Lisbon society the republic is wholly anathema. To defend it 
would be to lose caste. The large English colony, whose prop-
erty was specially threatened, is against it to a man. Americans 
should not be expected, it seems to me, to sympathise with the 
new order merely on the ground that it is a question of monarchy 
or republic. In these days of universal parliaments the old 
distinction is assuming a new meaning. Monarchy is becoming 
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little more than the rallying point of certain conservative forces, 
and one's attitude toward the revolution will depend less upon 
the old political distinctions than upon one's newer social and 
religious prejudices. 
I have said that the Lisbon working classes lack cohesion and 
are incapable of organisation. There is one aspect of the revolu-
tion which leads one to ask whether this statement can be true. 
I refer to the remarkable rele played by a secret political society 
known as the carbonarios. It may be admitted that a secret 
society is not a high form of political association; but all agree 
that the carbonarios have shown remarkable efficiency, which is at 
least a sign of cohesion. This society, whose numbers, organisa-
tion, and membership can be only vaguely surmised, is popularly 
supposed to consist of about ten thousand men, grouped in 
blocks of five, only one of whom knows the identity of any mem-
ber outside. Possibly this was its early form, when secrecy was 
so necessary. According to common report they are the minute-
men of the republic, an informal secret police ready at a moment's 
notice to instigate or to suppress a riot, to wreck a monarchist 
rising before it is fairly launched, and to act as spies and secret 
accusers against the enemies of the republic. Dr. Affonso Costa, 
the one strong man of the republic, whom the monarchists exe-
crate as the embodiment of the prince of darkness, is said to lean 
upon them for support. He is even suspected of being controlled 
by them. The extreme monarchist view is that this small 
minority, the very offscourings of humanity, is now ruling the 
great majority through secret accusation and terror. I do not 
know in how far this is true nor could I discover what proportion 
of the society is composed of workingmen. 
It is true, however, that espionage and arbitrary imprison-
ment are causing something like a reign of terror in Lisbon. 
Opponents of the government who discuss political questions in 
public places do so apprehensively, in undertones. It is also true 
that there has been much monarchist plotting. There was little 
bloodletting at the revolution. The monarchists were merely 
surprised. It is only natural that they should hope to regain 
power in the manner they lost it. All their efforts so far, however, 
have been worse than failures. They have served merely to fill 
the prisons. The government's method of repression has re-
cently been deeply discredited by the discovery that the last 
monarchist plot was not only, like some of the others, betrayed 
THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
by the secret police, but was actually instigated by them, after 
the worst Russian example. The government's treatment of 
political prisoners has from the first attracted unfavourable 
attention abroad, especially in England. The subject is one of 
bitter controversy, upon which it is difficult to speak with con-
fidence; but a few notorious cases have occurred in which the 
accused have been imprisoned for long periods without trial, 
contrary to Portuguese law; and from detailed descriptions of a 
republican lawyer engaged in the defence of political prisoners, 
I am persuaded that many of the prisoners have had only the 
travesty of a trial, partly because of the bias, inexperience, and 
unfitness of the new revolutionary judges. No distinction is 
made between the political prisoners and ordinary criminals, who 
are confined together. This is defended on the ground that the 
political prisoners have exceeded the bounds of even military 
opposition. Not content with appealing to arms, they have tried 
to secure foreign intervention, and must therefore be classed not 
as political prisoners but as traitors. It is also said in defence of 
the prisons that they are in no worse condition than under the 
monarchy. Unfortunately, this is saying little. 
The treatment of political prisoners and the religious question 
are the two sources of widespread bitterness in this revolution. 
"Politics are a dirty business, mamma, " wrote a Portuguese 
young lady recently, after marrying into a political family. So 
they are, not only in Portugal, but everywhere, especially in 
times of revolution. There never was a glorious revolution-or 
a glorious reaction. 
II 
I have tried to show that the Portuguese revolution is essen-
tially a struggle between social classes. It is now necessary to 
retrace our steps and to discuss its anti-monarchical and anti-
clerical phases; for it is also a revolt against the monarchy and 
the Church. The misgovernment of the monarchy will be made 
sufficiently clear if we confine our attention to that pulse of the 
body politic, the administration of finances. The manner in 
which a state collects and spends its funds is a sufficient test of 
its efficiency and character. 
In speaking of the misgovernment of the monarchy, we do not 
mean the monarchy alone so much as the ancient regime, which 
was parliamentary. The deplorable state of the Portuguese 
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finances is chiefly the work of the rotative parties of the Cortes, 
differing as parties so often do in no essential principle. The de-
fect of the crown was not misrule but failure to rule at all. The 
house of Braganga has not been one of strong, purposeful per-
sonalities. John IV., the first of the line, was inactive and un-
enterprising. He would never have accepted the crown but for 
the superior intelligence and energy of his wife. His descendants, 
who have inherited only too many of his qualities, have never 
appealed strongly to the popular imagination. English people 
sometimes say proudly, "We English love our royalties"; the 
Portuguese have been lukewarm toward theirs. Neither King 
Carlos nor Queen Amelie was popular, and the former was the 
victim of innumerable libellous attacks which were widely be-
lieved. Monarchists have told me that at the revolution few 
regretted the monarchy as such. 
There was a popular but quite erroneous impression that the 
financial disorders of the state were due to the extravagance of 
the Court. Maria Pia's jewels, the Pena, Ajuda, and Necessidades 
palaces have played a r6le in popular imagination similar to the 
diamond necklace and amusements of Marie Antoinette. Their 
importance has been greatly exaggerated. The Portuguese civil 
list was in truth too small to maintain the court with dignity. 
The crown was constantly in debt to the state through illegal 
advances known as adeantamentos. Its affairs were amiably and 
loosely administered; and this in the face of modern democracy is 
fatal. A certain court official is said to have held eighteen offices 
at one time. The fault was. not royal extravagance so much as 
the evaporation of the funds before they reached the king's 
hands. The court did not set an example of strict accountability, 
and like the state was constantly on the verge of bankruptcy. 
As for Portuguese finances they are indescribable. The 
national debt has risen in fifty years, without wars or other 
national crises, to be one of the largest in Europe in proportion to 
population. M. Marvaud gives the following comparative figures 
of national indebtedness: Russia, 156 francs per capita,. Austria-
Hungary, 323; Italy, 400; Spain, 475; Portugal, 750. The taxes 
are larger per capita than those of the world powers, Great Bri-
tain, France, or Germany, whose wealth is incomparably greater. 
The depth of this tragedy becomes apparent only when one 
realises that there is little to show for the expenditure. As a 
military power Portugal is not formidable, even in proportion to 
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its size. The navy seldom leaves its anchorage and is said to be 
unseaworthy. The army is better, but not perfectly equipped. 
The railways, roads, and other means of communication have 
cost great sums; b}Jt they are inferior and entirely inadequate. 
Few governments have done so little for the national wealth, for 
trade, agriculture, or social improvements. The natural resources 
are undeveloped. The colonies lie dormant. The elementary 
schools are pitiful. According to a statement made by a deputy 
in the Cortes in 1897, a very large proportion of this crushing 
indebtedness is due merely to an accumulation of annual deficits, 
which in tum are due chiefly to leakage in the collection and 
expenditure of the public funds. There are few nations whose 
financial history is more deeply tragic. 
If you ask a Portuguese how such things can possibly be, he 
will answer in exactly the words we use in America in trying to 
explain away our own political corruption-"the politicians." 
Unfortunately this is no explanation in either case. It is a hard 
truth, but the politicians of every country reflect the national 
character. Nearly everything that one disapproves of in Portu-
gal may be said to rise from two sources: first, to what the econo-
mists call the law of diminishing returns, which explains its 
poverty; second, to the blight of imperialism, which explains its 
disorganisation and corruption. Portugal was for centuries the 
centre of a rich empire that drained her of men as she drained it 
of wealth. With a stream of treasure flowing in upon her it 
was impossible to maintain the old Portuguese virtues. Thrift, 
abstemiousness, and vigor gave way to looseness and corrup-
tion. A non-mercantile nation can draw profits from a colonial 
empire only as Spain and Portugal have done, by administrative 
and fiscal exploitation; and this reacts disastrously upon the 
mother country. The richer Portuguese colonies have been lost; 
the habits remain. 
A serious crisis came in 1892. National bankruptcy was 
temporarily averted by arbitrarily lowering the interest on the 
national debt and imposing numerous new taxes, including those 
heavy tariffs which so ruinously increased the price of food. It 
was of little avail, for the annual deficits continued. In 1907 it 
was clear that drastic reform and a revolution were the only al-
ternatives. Following numerous precedents, King Carlos reverted 
to a dictatorship and entrusted all the power of the state to Dom 
Joao Franco, who unfortunately proved unequal to the heavy 
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task imposed upon him. He began impetuously enough. The 
Cortes was dissolved sine die, and numerous salutary reforms were 
instituted by arbitrary decree. The scandalously numerous 
sinecures were vigorously attacked, improved methods of finance 
were inaugurated, and the deficit was greatly reduced. It was 
a promising beginning. The opposition to these necessary but 
illegal measures was naturally bitter; but it is noteworthy that the 
old rotative parties, which were nominally monarchist, were as 
unmanageable as the republicans. The monarchy was a house 
divided against itself. Franco met agitation with repression. 
Newspapers were suppressed, municipalities coerced. Hundreds 
of his political opponents were arrested and preparations were 
made to deport them to the colonies without trial upon the simple 
order of three magistrates named for this purpose. Among these 
prisoners was Dr. Affonso Costa, who learned the art of political 
repression from personal experience under the monarchy. 
On February 1,1908, while the passions of this conflict were 
at their height, the royal family was unwisely permitted to drive 
through the streets of Lisbon unguarded. Near the corner of the 
Praga do Commercio, the royal coach was fired upon at close 
range by men concealed under the arches. The King and his 
eldest son, the heir-apparent, were instantly killed in the presence 
of Queen Amelie and Manoel. I t would have been better if the 
monarchy could have ended with this tragedy. It would have 
been dignified and consecrated by a pathos and heroism that was 
later lacking. The two short years of King Manoel's troubled 
reign, with its dissolving ministries, its court intrigues, its mean-
ness, mismanagement, and treason, merely served to show that 
the monarchy was bankrupt politically, as well as financially. 
The reforms of Franco were speedily undone, but no new law was 
passed during this reign. The young King was inexperienced and 
unnerved. The old parties renewed their senseless struggles, with 
apparently no suspicion that the ground beneath them was 
completely undermined. The revolution would have come earlier, 
but prudence required a decent interval of time to avoid the 
appearance of founding the republic upon an assassination. 
The explosion came on October 5, 1910. The conspirators 
had won over the navy, which opened fire upon the Necessidades 
Palace. It was in part a military conspiracy like the Turkish 
revolution, though the troops were divided. An unpaid soldiery 
is a poor defence. The fighting, if one can call it fighting, was 
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extremely confused. I have talked with many eye witnesses, but 
they saw little and that little they did not know the meaning of. 
A body of republican troops barricaded the upper end of the 
Avenida, and the marks of their shell fire are still to be seen in 
that fine boulevard; but what they were firing at is a matter of 
some uncertainty. According to best informed opinion, only 
about seventy-five persons were killed, many of whom were non-
combatants. A few ardent patriots have persuaded themselves 
that it was a gallant affair; others are of the opinion that both 
sides ran away. No one could tell what was happening. A 
naval officer committed suicide at the moment of victory, sup-
posing that all was lost. The victory consisted in the flight of the 
King from the Necessidades-whether in terror or under compul-
sion, whether in the Spanish ambassador's car, with or without 
the connivance of the repUblican leaders, it is hardly worth while 
to inquire. Everyone has his own story. The important point 
is that the power had slipped from listless hands, almost without 
a struggle. 
III 
The republican provisional government had hardly been 
installed before it began with feverish activity, without waiting 
for an election or the calling of the Cortes, to issue innumerable 
revolutionary decrees covering an astonishing range of subjects. 
They were of course as illegal as anything Franco had done, but 
a new era had been proclaimed and it was necessary to make an 
immediate showing. It is worth while to mention a few changes 
of a trivial character because they show the spirit of the new 
regime and the source of its inspiration. 
To exhibit the republic in the character of an intellectual 
illumination, the new French method of indicating the hours of 
the day by numbers up to twenty-four was adopted, and the 
spelling of the Portuguese language was simplified and phoneti-
cised. Unfortunately, there was no time to consult the Brazilians, 
who continue the old spelling, thus creating in a measure two 
Portuguese languages. A new flag was adopted, red and green, 
the positivists' colours, an astonishing procedure to those who 
look upon the flag as a national rather than a party emblem. The 
national holidays were reduced in number and renamed after 
military and literary personages in place of saints; not altogether 
to the pleasure of the unillumined populace, who imagined that 
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a new set of obscure saints was being foisted upon them. "Why," 
they exclaimed, "we never even heard of Saint Camoes! " Streets 
and squares bearing the names of saints have been renamed, some 
of them in honour of republican newspapers. The word king 
having become obsolete, the coinage was altered to avoid speak-
ing of reis. The shopkeepers, with more zeal than knowledge, 
followed suit by' calling their Christmas cakes bolos nacionaes 
instead of bolos reis, forgetting that they were named in memory 
of the Magi, not of the Bragangas. Acrimonious disputes were 
waged between irate monarchists and stubborn shopkeepers as 
to whether bolo real and bolo nacional could possibly refer to the 
same thing: a completely different outlook upon the world was 
indicated by an affirmative or negative answer to that silly ques-
tion. It is even said that a man named King felt impelled to 
change the name of his hotel; whereupon he had no end of trouble 
with mischievous monarchists inquiring after the vanished 
establishment and trying to engage apartments in it. 
These changes, whose Gallic origin is obvious, have been much 
criticised, especially by the English residents, as frivolous beyond 
measure; but at least they make a deep impression at a trifling 
expenditure of energy. They create the desired illusion of great 
changes. To the monarchists they are as gall and wormwood. 
No monarchists could be induced to adopt the new spelling, to 
speak of Rua de Sao Roque as Rua Mundo, or of the Rato as 
Praga de Brazil. Thus a man's very mode of speech proclaims 
his politics. As long as social relations remain, as at present, 
impossible between members of the opposing parties, this is not 
altogether an inconvenience. 
The provisional government did not, however, confine its 
attention merely to surface things. Without authorisation from 
any source, it did not hesitate to take in hand so difficult and 
thorny a question as the relations between church and state. Only 
five days after the revolution it expelled the religious orders upon 
twenty-four hours' notice. It was a stringent measure roughly 
enforced. Shortly after, church and state were separated, not by 
concordat or by formal legislation, but by simple administrative 
decree. Catholicism is no longer the religion of the state. All 
religious bodies are on an equal footing. The vast church 
property was nationalised, though the congregations are permit-
ted the free use of the edifices. Churches must hereafter be 
supported by free alms, except for the state pension provided for 
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present incumbents during the remainder of their lives. It is 
even provided that they may marry, and provision has been 
made for the support of wives and children who may survive 
them. The schools are secularised and there is to be no religious 
instruction in them. Cemeteries are secularised. Religious 
oaths were abolished. Other decrees facilitated divorce and 
changed the marriage laws in a sense extremely repugnant to 
Catholic teaching. Yet, strange to say, the church was not to be 
entirely free, for the state retained a certain supervision over 
church finances and appointments. The law is in fact rather 
more severe than that of France; and no one looks upon France 
as exactly the home of political moderation. 
I must confess to a certain degree of anti-clerical prejudice as 
a result of my few months' stay in Portugal; but I cannot for-
bear criticising these decrees, not so much on the ground of 
abstract theory; as of political expediency. They correspond to 
no pressing need of Portuguese society, and they outrage quite 
gratuitously the most cherished ideals of a majority of the Por-
tuguese people. It is true that there is a deep hostility to the 
clergy in certain classes of Lisbon, Oporto, Santarem, and many 
other towns, which produced extraordinary scenes during the 
first days of the revolution. The lack of looting at that time is 
by some attributed to the fact that the rabble was so busy chasing 
priests. A church tower near the Palacio das C~rtes in Lisbon 
was riddled by bullets and another church, Santos, was the scene 
of a spectacular fusillade at night, with its white towers beauti-
fully illuminated by the searchlights of the fleet riding nearby 
in the Tagus. There were wild rumours that the priests had 
opened fire from these towers, that the city was undermined with 
secret passageways, and that the priests intended as a last resort 
to blow it up rather than surrender their authority. Even now 
a priest who meets a procession of schoolchildren under the con-
voy of their teacher may be greeted with shrill derisive cries of 
"Jesuit." During my stay there two years after the revolution, 
a priest was stoned by schoolchildren. Yet Portugal as a whole, 
especially in the country, is Catholic. Even in the towns the 
hostility was directed chiefly against the foreign religious orders, 
which had increased during recent years and were in high favour 
at court. This is said to be the source of Queen Amelie's un-
popularity. The Jesuits were specially feared on account of their 
political activity, and the dislike for the orders was shared to a 
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certain extent by the secular clergy themselves. As for the latter, 
they were apathetic, like the society they lived in. Their educa-
tion was narrowly religious and did not attempt to prepare them 
for leadership in ordinary practical affairs. They were ill-paid. 
There was no system of promotion and little supervision. There 
was no incentive. They were left to stagnate in their little 
parishes, without the association of a resident gentry or a bour-
geoisie. Their life was quite different from that of an English 
country curate, or an American country clergyman. If some of 
them through isolation and idleness fell into evil ways, it lost 
nothing in the telling by the republican press, which had a keen 
sense for clerical and court scandal. The church in Portugal 
was not in a condition to weather a storm. It had identified 
itself with a. political party or perhaps one should say with the 
government, and now shares its fate. But to declare war upon 
it, without provocation as far as the secular clergy are concerned, 
was singularly unwise. The bishops are in exile for resisting, not 
the new regime, but the new law. The parish priests, after much 
hesitation and pressure from their superiors, have for the most 
part refused the pensions, which means that they are nearly 
destitute. This is the most serious and most obvious mistake the 
republican leaders have made. They have wantonly created one 
of their most difficult problems, and in the end the results may 
prove fatal. 
What has the future in store for the republic and for Portu-
gal ? Well informed resident foreigners take a gloomy view, and 
commonly predict bankruptcy and intervention. Portugal, they 
say, is a second Egypt. A Kitchener, backed by foreign troops, 
could take a short cut out of all their difficulties by abolishing 
useless public offices in a wholesale manner, and by selling the 
colonies. A politician dependent upon public opinion can hardly 
do either. I cannot persuade myself, however, that foreign 
intervention, always a possibility, is either imminent or desirable. 
As for the republic, Affonso Costa finds himself confronted 
with Cromwell's insoluble problem, how to make the revolution, 
which was the work of a small minority, acceptable to the nation 
as a whole. How can a thinly veiled dictatorship be changed 
into a republic reflecting the will of the majority, when the 
majority is monarchist? In the important towns the republicans 
probably have a majority, and what is more important, are still 
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united. The moment they form factions, like the Spanish repub-
licans, the end will have come. Already there are ominous signs. 
The editor of a republican paper, who is in receipt of a pension 
as one of the founders of the republic, recently saw his printing 
establishment smashed by a still more republican mob. In the 
country it is impossible to make the peasants understand what a 
republic is. The government has spent considerable sums in a 
republican propaganda, with meagre results. A young republi-
can who had taken part in this work told me his experiences. 
Some of the peasants thought the wages of Portugal were paid 
by the King. "Why did they kill him?" they asked. "He was a 
good man. He always paid us. " "How can such people have 
any conception what a republic is!" he exclaimed despairingly. 
Political abstractions certainly will not move them. Nor have 
they profited like the French peasants by a spoliation of the land-
lords. The revolution has done little for them, and they are 
emigrating in ever increasing numbers. In the end, this will, no 
doubt, raise the standard of living of those who remain and will 
act as a dissolvent of their fatal passivity. Meanwhile, they can-
not be won over to the republic, and they will not fight for the 
monarchy. The fate of the republic, which is a republic only 
in name, rests at present with the lower classes of Lisbon. 
The future of Portugal is involved in its pressing financial 
problem, which is grave but not yet hopeless. If the Portuguese 
could but persuade themselves to part with their colonies, those 
last links with a glorious but ruinous past! It is these colonies, 
the rich but undeveloped remnants of a vastly richer empire, 
which give to the revolution its international importance. Great 
Britain and Germany, to say nothing of other great powers, are 
deeply interested in their fate; but as long as international rela-
tions remain, as at present, somewhat unsatisfactory, it would be 
disquieting to raise the question of their partition. England has 
for centuries occupied a position somewhat approaching a pro-
tector~te over Portuga1. Ever since the time of Cromwell the 
two countries have been yoked in an unequal alliance, and Eng-
land has guaranteed the Portuguese colonies. Even before 
Cromwell's time, there were large societies of English merchants 
at Lisbon, Oporto, and elsewhere, who now form an important 
element in the commercial life of those cities. The tramways, 
the lighting systems, and the telephones have passed into their 
efficient hands after Portuguese companies have made a failure 
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of them. They have become so profitable that there is a great 
outcry of foreign exploitation, and they were favourite objects of 
mob violence during the early days of the revolution. The revolu-
tion was unwelcome to the British government in many ways, but 
it nevertheless confined its action to a vigorous protection of its 
subjects and their threatened property-the exact antithesis to 
our humiliating and disastrous policy in Mexico. As a result, 
the British are feared, respected, and unmolested. No other 
government, not even Spain, which is so deeply disturbed by this 
neighbouring object lesson in republicanism and revolution, dares 
intervene without English consent, and that consent England 
shows no sign of giving. We may therefore expect in the absence 
of untoward events that the Portuguese will be left to determine 
their future without foreign interference; but that future is 
in the lap of the gods. 
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